This week’s session involved addressing causes of legitimacy and assessing the received wisdom that a) service delivery instrumentally enhances state legitimacy and b) inversely, weak institutions and a lack of service delivery can cause a state to lose legitimacy.
Mc Loughlin’s historical case study of the provision of Higher education in Sri Lanka between 1956-1974 demonstrated how the manipulation of public service provision by the State undermined legitimacy because of the perception of unfairness in service provision, leading to armed separatism in the north of the country. In the case of Sri Lanka the State violated norms in the eyes of both the minority and majority ethnic groups. Though discriminatory policies were designed to negatively impact the Tamils, they were apparently unfair in the eyes of both.
This case study is not alone in challenging the service delivery-legitimacy nexus, as organisations such as the OECD have highlighted other sources of legitimacy, which can take precedence within different contexts. However what became particularly evident to me and stayed with me from the debate explored this week were the considerations about whose views count when conferring legitimacy on the State.
I think that this aspect struck me because previous study of legitimacy has revealed the concept to be somewhat elusive and as much rooted in perceptions of reality as in fact. In this sense the ability to confer legitimacy is based on the power available to an individual or group to make their perception of a situation matter. Not all citizens are equal in their power to confer legitimacy and so trade-offs between different groups can be necessary. On this basis, the social contract between the State and citizens can be asymmetric based on different expectations of treatment from the State and different abilities to make this matter to the State.
In the case of Sri Lanka, the State chose to prioritise one group at the clear expense of another, however the violation of the social contract that this represented to the group supposedly privileged by the government’s education policies, forced the government to relent. Such a reality has caused me to ponder the wider implications of this approach for assessing (State-enabled) well-being within development.
Happiness & Contentment: the faux friends of Development
Nanak Kakwani’s contention is that happiness ultimately isn’t a good measure of well-being because, as Sen says, people can be happy or unhappy irrespective of how they live, even if their capabilities and achievements never increase. Happiness can also only be measured by people’s perceptions, which may change drastically in a short period.
Relating this back to the asymmetric relationship between the State and different societal groups, it seems clear that as much as people’s opinions on poverty can prevent them from fighting marginalisation, catering to the opinions and desires of one group, in order to gain legitimacy can also cause marginalisation and the loss of legitimacy with other groups. In Sri Lanka this turned out for the benefit of those who were marginalised, but what about situations when this is not the case?
And this is particularly problematic because of the subjective and potentially fickle nature of the opinions of groups of citizens, particularly when comparing themselves to other groups.
The fact that the conflict in McLoughlin’s work, erupted when the frustrations of one group were exacerbated by the opportunity to juxtapose and compare their experiences with that of other groups, is surely significant. I’ve seen ethno-tribal tensions in Nigeria, follow similar patterns. That said, I am mindful that such a conclusion can breed a contemptuous attitude towards the opinions of citizens who are affected by policies, which I think can be equally dangerous.
So where does that leave us?
While I don’t think it’s right to dismiss the important role that service delivery does play in conferring state legitimacy, I think that it is really important to maintain an awareness of the shaky foundation for state legitimacy on which this relationship can rest.
A theme which emerged last week and which I have continued to grapple with throughout this degree and in antecedent musings – cue potential dissertation topic- is of where we respect (normatively) different perspectives in policy intervention, and where we override these sensitivities in the name of doing what’s best for people. As I’ve seen extremely clearly this week these issues are relevant to domestic policy as well as international interventions.
Sources
- Kakwani, N. (2006) Poverty and Wellbeing, International Poverty Centre, UNDP in Poverty in Focus: What is poverty? Concepts and measures Poverty International Poverty Centre, UNDP
- Mcloughlin, C. (2014) When Does Service Delivery Improve the Legitimacy of a Fragile or Conflict-Affected State?
- Mcloughlin, C. (2016) Unfair service provision, contested legitimacy, and instability in divided societies: Evidence from Sri Lanka, Developmental Leadership Program, University of Birmingham
- OECD, (2010), ‘The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations: Unpacking Complexity’, International Network on Conflict and Fragility, OECD, Paris
The Narrator's Pen 